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Abstract
Background: The increasing prevalence of chronic disease represents a significant burden on
most health systems. This paper explores the market failures and policy failures that exist in the
management of chronic diseases.
Discussion: There are many sources of market failure in health care that undermine the efficiency
of chronic disease management. These include incomplete information as well as information
asymmetry between providers and consumers, the effect of externalities on consumer behaviour,
and the divergence between social and private time preference rates. This has seen government
and policy interventions to address both market failures and distributional issues resulting from the
inability of private markets to reach an efficient and equitable distribution of resources. However,
these have introduced a series of policy failures such as distorted re-imbursement arrangements
across modalities and delivery settings.
Summary: The paper concludes that market failure resulting from a preference of individuals for
'immediate gratification' in the form of health care and disease management, rather than
preventative services, where the benefits are delayed, has a major impact on achieving an efficient
allocation of resources in markets for the management of chronic diseases. This distortion is
compounded by government health policy that tends to favour medical and pharmaceutical
interventions further contributing to distortions in the allocation of resources and inefficiencies in
the management of chronic disease.
Background
Chronic disease is a major cause of morbidity in most
high income countries, consuming approximately 70% of
health care expenditure in the US [1]. The World Health
Organisation (WHO) in 2002 estimated that chronic dis-
ease would account for 72% of the global disease burden,
with 35 million deaths or approximately 60% of total
deaths worldwide attributed to chronic disease [2]. The
increase in the prevalence of chronic disease has been a
pattern noted in most developed countries since the
1970s, and this trend is likely to continue with population
ageing. Despite evidence of increasing prevalence of
chronic diseases and ageing populations, health systems
have supported reactive management to acute illness,
injury and acute exacerbations of established diseases,
rather than primary and secondary disease prevention [3-
5]. Funding arrangements, including health insurance
tend to be focused on hospital and medical care and phar-
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maceutical management distorting care towards these
modalities [6].
Whilst health care markets are routinely described as not
conforming to the conditions required for competitive
markets, when analysing the competitiveness or features
of separate markets within the health care system, there
are differences with respect to the degree of divergence
from the assumptions required for competitiveness. Such
differences are especially apparent when comparing mar-
kets for acute health care to those for chronic disease man-
agement. Differences particularly relate to the role of
information, including the degree of information asym-
metry between providers and consumers; and the role of
intertemporal factors and the associated rate of time dis-
count that create a wedge between individual and social
preferences for health care.
Market failures, inefficiencies and distributional issues
(equity) are the primary reasons for government interven-
tion in the health care market. Governments intervene
through direct provision of services, including direct fund-
ing to public or private bodies for the provision of health
services; subsidy to consumers for private health services;
or subsidies to consumers for the purchase of private
health insurance. In general government intervention in
any market has flow-on effects to other parts of the market
or related markets, which can create further distortions.
The market distortions that arise from these flow-on
effects can be termed 'policy failure'. In the health care sec-
tor policy failure is widely observed and arises for instance
where funding or subsidy of services occurs irrespective of
evidence of cost effectiveness and contribution to other
societal objectives.
The objective of this paper is to describe the important
market and policy failures present in chronic disease mar-
kets, and to provide an overview of policy options to
address these sources of failure.
Discussion
Information asymmetry or the 'expert patient'?
Information asymmetry between providers and consum-
ers has long been accepted as a feature of health markets,
and is widely recognised as a cause of market failure [7-9].
The imperfect agency relationship that arises is a possible
contributor to excess demand for health care (also termed
'supplier induced demand'), where the provider has an
income or financial incentive to promote excessive health
care use [10]. Whilst this is a potential issue for all health
markets, the degree to which imperfect agency is likely to
distort patterns of consumption is likely to differ across
health care markets.
Information in health care necessary for informed or
rational decision making by consumers relates to the
effectiveness of a particular intervention or service pro-
vider. Effectiveness can be judged from a population or
societal perspective; or from an individual's perspective.
Whilst consumers in all health care markets might not be
expected to have information pertaining to clinical or cost
effectiveness at the population level, given the choice
from a range of interventions, consumers may have ade-
quate information to make an informed choice to meet
their own individual needs. In relation to chronic dis-
eases, it is increasingly the case that consumers with estab-
lished chronic disease may be at least as informed as the
clinician in relation to management options relevant to
their individual needs, whilst the opposite is almost cer-
tainly true in relation to acute care. Given the ongoing
nature of chronic disease, it is likely that consumers over
time will gain considerable knowledge of their disease,
including management options, so they would be well
placed to make an informed choice with respect to both
their provider and primary care treatment.
Approaches to chronic disease management increasingly
refer to the consumer as a 'partner' in their disease man-
agement [1,11-13]. Indeed Wilson recognises a con-
sumer's own knowledge base in contributing to successful
chronic disease management in the following statement,
'by living with and learning to manage a long term illness
many people develop a high degree of expertise and wis-
dom' [[11];p771]. This recognition of the 'expert patient'
in the management of chronic disease has lead to what
has been termed a 'partnership model', in which people
with a chronic condition play an active role in making
decisions about their own health care [11-13]. However
funding and delivery arrangements that fail to recognise
the consumer's own knowledge with respect to their dis-
ease don't support a partnership model and hence are
likely to result in treatment and management decisions
that are not compatible with maximising individual and
population health outcomes [14].
Time inconsistent preferences and consumption of services 
in chronic disease management
The argument for discounting future health benefits at the
same rate as that of financial resources in private capital
markets has support in the economic literature. Olsen
suggests however that it is possible that individuals have a
different time preference for health compared to ordinary
consumption goods and secondly, that an individual's
time preference for their own health may differ to that
which they attribute to a social intertemporal preference
for health [15]. It is also likely that an individual's time
preference for their own health will differ according to
whether they are valuing an intervention with an immedi-
ate gain compared to one that has a future (and less cer-
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tain) gain. Although consumers with a chronic condition
may be able to value services and interventions from
which they derive an immediate benefit, their capacity to
recognise and value benefits that accrue into the future is
less certain. That is an individual consumer is likely to
place a lower value, or excessively discount, the down-
stream benefits that derive from consumption of prevent-
ative services compared to the value they place on
consumption that derives an immediate benefit. This may
arise from a myopic defect as described by Pigou [in [16]],
an individual's preference for life-saving interventions as
opposed to health improvements [17], or the cost of time
to the consumer in primary and secondary prevention.
A discrepancy between an individual's future time prefer-
ence and the social intertemporal preference rate for
health [15] has implications for resource allocation in the
management of chronic disease. Where the difference
relates to that of 'population uncertainty'; that is the
future benefit will accrue to the 'statistical' or unknown
persons versus the known individual, current resource
allocation decisions may not be consistent with socially
efficient allocation over time. That is an individual with a
chronic disease may excessively discount future benefits
in determining their current consumption decisions, com-
pared to a socially optimal level of consumption. Social
benefits from health care, including those externalities
that are derived from reducing future mortality and mor-
bidity and any associated reduction in need for high cost
care such as hospitalisation, will be maximised with an
optimal consumption of primary and secondary prevent-
ative care by an individual, particularly in the early stages
of chronic disease. It is unlikely however that an individ-
ual's current private consumption decisions will reflect
the externality or future social health benefit attributable
to preventative care.
Social and private benefits from preventative care will
almost certainly differ. Benefits from health care, includ-
ing effective preventative care that reduce mortality and
morbidity and associated costs of care (formal and infor-
mal) accrue to both the wider society as well as the indi-
vidual. Consider for instance the externality or impact on
others of an individual who has a stroke that may have
been avoided. If the impacts on others are not taken into
account in the individual's health behaviours, then their
current consumption of preventative services will not be
at the socially optimal level.
Issues of intergenerational equity may also arise where
future generations have to compete for access to health
care resources. People with advanced disease may require
considerable health care resources that may have been
avoidable in part through the optimal consumption of
preventative services. Future generations may ultimately
carry the burden arising from the under-consumption of
preventative services by the current generation.
It can also be argued that individual consumer preferences
in relation to the consumption of preventative services
might not be rational from an individual's perspective,
similar to that of the adoption of harmful behaviours in
the rational addiction model. O'Donoghue and Rabin's
model of 'time inconsistent' preferences [18] has been
used to explain in part the consumption of 'bads', includ-
ing rising levels of obesity [19]. O'Donoghue and Rabin
suggest that a preference for immediate gratification
results in the under-consumption of activities with imme-
diate costs and delayed rewards when considered ex-poste
compared with ex-ante [18]. This is highly relevant to a
consumer's attitude to the prevention and management of
a chronic condition and especially the adoption of harm-
ful or unhealthy lifestyle behaviours. The argument of
'immediate gratification' suggests that the market failure is
more than just the recognition that consumers prefer
gains now to those in the future, solvable with the appli-
cation of a suitable discount rate. If preferences change
over time, the assumption of rational and stable prefer-
ences underlying the competitive market model no longer
applies and consumer choice, based on ex-ante prefer-
ences that differ from ex-poste will not maximise social
welfare. Similarly where there is a difference between the
individual's and the social marginal rate of time prefer-
ence, for example due to the existence of a social external-
ity, an individual consumer's choice will result in a loss of
social welfare. The divergence between the two may be
exacerbated by advertising which, as noted by Moodie
and colleagues [19], may actively promote harmful
behaviours (such as poor nutrition choices) in relation to
chronic disease management and prevention.
In short the assumption of the rational consumer with
well-informed stable preferences underlying the competi-
tive market model does not always hold where future ben-
efits are concerned. This is particularly relevant to chronic
disease prevention and management, and may be a signif-
icant contributor to market failure in chronic disease.
Market distortion arising from output-based and fee-for-
service funding for health care services
Governments have intervened in health care markets in
most developed countries in recognition of market fail-
ures and equity and distributional considerations. The lat-
ter has seen a focus on universal access to basic hospital,
medical and emergency services. Whilst this will (and
should) continue as a dominant focus of government,
changes in population health needs, particularly the
increasing prevalence of chronic disease, suggest that gov-
ernment intervention should be concerned with the
achievement of allocative efficiency across the health sys-
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tem. However funding models are often focused on
achieving technical efficiency, or simple throughput, with
no capacity to address the mix of health services. For
example, output-based or fee-for-service funding arrange-
ments are oriented towards achieving technical efficiency
in a single market, for example medical or hospital mar-
kets. The US Medicare system has been described as one
geared towards paying for the hospital episode as an acute
event, rather than paying for activities that might reduce
the need for hospitalisation [6]. In some funding models
hospitals are penalised if they invest in activities that
reduce the need for hospitalisation even where this repre-
sents a cost effective approach to health care.
The nature of the hospital episode has changed, moving
towards invasive diagnostic and screening procedures [6]
with supply-side moral hazard, arising in the context of
fee-for-service payment, and demand side moral hazard,
arising out of third party payment (through insurers). Fee-
for-service reimbursement also reinforces the silo nature
of clinical practice, with clinicians, rather than taking a
system-wide view with respect to total resource impact or
the patient's overall health, driven by their own activities
and incentives they face as individual providers.
As discussed above fee-for-service payment systems pro-
vide incentives for health care providers to promote con-
sumer demand for their services, especially where
consumers face a zero or subsidised price. The increase in
consumption is not likely to be uniform across all serv-
ices, but will be influenced by the scope of services under
the fee-for-service schedule, and also a consumer prefer-
ence for more immediate benefits and a focus on current
health concerns. Preventative primary care services neces-
sary for cost effective management and prevention of
chronic disease are likely to miss out [20].
Where payment is based on a single episode of care or
service, health care providers have an incentive to increase
the number of consultations and reduce their length, as
more frequent and shorter consultations tend to support
higher incomes. Fee-for-service funding models encour-
age a focus of care on single health issues, rather than
more complex inter-related issues. Depending on the pay-
ment schedule, they may encourage additional visits for
each health problem, rather than a more holistic
approach in which the total health picture is considered.
More complex services, such as chronic disease prevention
and management, tend to be less conducive to short con-
sultation times and tend to require multi-disciplinary
team care, which can be difficult to achieve under fee-for-
service, than either a capitated or salary model. Such an
incentive pattern is unlikely to promote effective and cost
effective chronic disease management. If insurance, or
public subsidies favour medical care, as is common, this
will compound the distortions.
In relation to tertiary or hospital inpatient care, fee-for-
service or output-based payments, where the service is
defined as a single hospital separation often based on
diagnosis or procedure, will also distort service provision.
Where output is defined by diagnosis, providers have an
incentive to increase the supply of hospital care. However
such an incentive will not apply equally across all hospital
services, there is more likely to be an increase in the sup-
ply of specific types of hospital care. For instance, hospital
care is not homogeneous with respect to degree of risk to
the provider. In assessing risk, providers take into consid-
eration the service itself and the characteristics of the
patient. In general, procedural care carries a lower finan-
cial risk than non-procedural care, as resource inputs are
likely to be predictable and thus the provider can make a
judgement as to whether the cost is likely to be less than
the revenue. Characteristics of patients that are likely to
increase financial risk to the hospital include those factors
that are likely to influence length of stay, or at least make
length of stay difficult to predict. These include age, the
existence of co-morbidities and the stage of the patient's
disease. The provider's incentive to reduce financial risk is
consistent with discrimination against the management
of chronic disease in the acute care system.
Technological advances have also been oriented towards
diagnosis and procedural capability in the management
of acute conditions. For example advances in sameday
surgery have increased technical efficiency through new
techniques, or newer anaesthetic agents that minimise
recovery time and complications associated with surgery.
There has been less development in information systems
to support integrated and coordinated care management
in chronic disease [4]; technological improvement that
would be consistent with improving efficiency in the
ongoing management of chronic disease.
Market distortion arising from public subsidies for medical 
services
Where subsidies are not uniform, but depend on modality
or other health service characteristics, the more heavily
subsidized service will be promoted. This of course may
be the intention, but generally such subsidies are set with-
out regards to the distortions that this will create. Many
health systems provide more generous public subsidy for
medical and pharmaceutical services than for non-medi-
cal services. This is despite evidence suggesting that non-
medical services, including allied health services, may be
highly cost effective in the prevention and management of
chronic disease [21,22]. The price differential created by
public subsidy for medical primary care services means
that that the price to the consumer without insurance for
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non-medical services will be high relative to publicly sub-
sidised medical services and pharmaceuticals. This pro-
vides an incentive to the consumer to increase their
demand for medical services compared to non-medical
primary care services. This further enhances the monopoly
provision of medical services that is already present by
default of practice licensing and registration.
Even if the consumer has private health insurance, non-
medical services are likely to be capped unless the insurer
has both an incentive and the ability to reduce health care
costs, for example, by promoting alternative models of
health care delivery (such as case management), to their
insured population with chronic disease. Typically how-
ever, subsidy regimens mean that allied health services
will be underutilised relative to the level of consumption
that is optimal for people with chronic disease [6]. Such
funding arrangements create distorted incentives poten-
tially redirecting resources away from cost effective care
and undermining the role of non-medical primary care
services which are critical to the prevention and manage-
ment of chronic disease.
A further contributing factor to market distortions arising
in the primary care setting is the complementarities that
arise between medical care and pharmaceutical manage-
ment. Most ongoing pharmaceutical management
requires a prescription from a medical practitioner, thus
consumers require regular doctor visits, particularly where
drugs have been prescribed for long-term management of
chronic disease. Although there is a complimentary rela-
tionship that exists between medical and other non-med-
ical services, such as allied health care, they are also
substitutable services, and thus potential competitors,
particularly in the market for chronic disease manage-
ment.
Inequitable distribution of non-medical primary health 
care services relating to third party compensation
Even within the market for non-medical primary care
services there is likely to be an inequitable distribution of
services, where entitlement to third party compensation is
the driver of demand rather than clinical need. Unlike
road traffic and work-place accident victims, people with
chronic disease are often not entitled to third party com-
pensation for allied health and other non-medical pri-
mary care services, the exception being veterans and
holders of private health insurance. Increased demand for
these compensated services has resulted in a shift in sup-
ply to meet this demand, thus creating a relative shortage
of non-medical services. The shortage that has resulted
has enabled monopoly pricing, thus the service is targeted
to those who are able to pay, or who are eligible for third
party funding. Services become even less accessible and
affordable to the population with chronic disease or in
need of other preventative care. A second effect is that
non-medical service providers may focus their effort on
services needed by compensated (predominantly acci-
dent) victims, thus changing the mix or profile of services
that are delivered in the primary care sector away from
those needed by people with chronic disease.
Possible policy responses to market failures in chronic 
disease management
If the assumption is that consumers with a chronic condi-
tion are 'expert patients', information asymmetry is not a
significant cause of market failure in the market for
chronic disease management. Therefore, supporting con-
sumers to manage their care in partnership with provid-
ers, combined with the removal of funding anomalies is
necessary to achieve optimal care in chronic disease man-
agement and a health service mix across the system more
consistent with allocative efficiency objectives.
In the long run it is the price effect resulting from public
subsidies for some services and not others that is likely to
be the major influence on underutilisation of non-medi-
cal primary care and preventative services, rather than a
consumer's preference for acute care over health promo-
tion or secondary prevention. If the price for preventative
services was subsidised to the same degree as medical serv-
ices and pharmaceutical products there would be less
market distortion created by differential subsidy arrange-
ments. Moreover, ideally the level of subsidy (per service
and number of services) should reflect current evidence of
cost effectiveness.
Alternative market solutions to chronic disease manage-
ment could also be considered, particularly those that
encourage competition between providers and promote
consumer choice. Publicly provided and funded service
vouchers, for example through a scheme such as Medicare
in Australia, can support consumers to access appropriate
care from an allocative efficiency perspective from provid-
ers that may not be currently eligible for subsidy [23]. The
allocation of service vouchers could be based on evidence
of cost effectiveness of particular services or preventative
care for chronic conditions and be may be able to provide
sufficient incentives for consumers to access appropriate
care from their provider of choice. Where patients have
knowledge of their chronic disease then enabling them to
choose a provider eligible for a subsidy should be consist-
ent with improved health outcomes.
Service vouchers might also help overcome the larger mar-
ket failure in chronic disease management where individ-
uals are myopic with respect to the consumption of
preventative services. Vouchers provide a level of informa-
tion to the consumer about the services they should be
accessing to manage their disease. Consumers would have
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an entitlement to a given number and type of service
vouchers, and, if services are fully subsidised, the price
effect is removed from the consumption decision [23].
Other total system options include the adoption of risk-
adjusted capitated fund-holding models, which promote
flexibility in the service response.
Summary
Government intervention in health care markets through
funding and other mechanisms to address various sources
of market failure and inequity in the distribution of health
care and health outcomes is widely accepted. However,
where governments have intervened by subsidising some
types of services and service providers over others, irre-
spective of evidence of cost effectiveness, this will reduce
the ability of the market to achieve efficiency. This is an
issue for the management of chronic disease where gov-
ernment subsidy has favoured acute care, including acute
exacerbations of chronic disease, and medical services
rather than primary and secondary preventative services
that are more consistent with the cost effective manage-
ment of chronic disease [5]. These distortions are exacer-
bated by fee-for-service payment systems that provide
incentives for health care to be technically efficient at the
level of a single provider, however provide few incentives
for socially efficient delivery.
Resource shifts from acute care markets to markets for the
primary and secondary prevention of chronic disease,
supported through alternative and flexible funding
arrangements, are likely to be consistent with achieving
allocative efficiency across the health system. With the
increasing prevalence and burden associated with chronic
disease it is important that these issues are addressed.
Alternative funding mechanisms such as service vouchers
and fundholder or capitation models may overcome
some of the anomalies that have developed over time
between the provision of acute services and chronic dis-
ease management, supporting health system objectives of
equity and efficient allocation of health care resources.
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